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EVERYONE’S A CRITIC: DEFAMATION AND ANONYMITY ON 
THE INTERNET  
Internet publishing is easy and has become commonplace in our 
technology-focused society.  Although this type of publication can be 
exciting and helpful for those interested in communicating an idea, the 
issue of anonymous speech on the Internet has created some 
complications in the rather established tort of defamation.  This article 
will discuss two approaches recently taken by two different courts in 
response to the Internet-anonymity issue and will evaluate them based on 
their ability to strike a balance between protecting free speech and 
protecting against defamation. 
Introduction 
The proliferation of the Internet over the last few years has added a new dimension to the 
world of communication and media.  Not only does the Internet provide endless sources of 
information for the general public, it also provides members of public the opportunity to become 
a source of information themselves.  Web-boards, websites, listservs and chat rooms are only a 
few of the cyber-forums where anyone with Internet access can share their opinions and publish 
statements of fact.  
While this publishing opportunity can be exciting and helpful for those interested in 
communicating an idea, the issue of anonymous speech on the Internet has created some 
complications in the established tort of defamation.  Internet forums typically involve dialogue 
between anonymous or pseudo-anonymous individuals, making it difficult for would-be plaintiffs 
in defamation cases to know who to sue or even how to sue them.  Many defendants in Internet 
defamation actions claim that revealing their identity for the purpose of a defamation suit is not 
necessary and, in fact, is a violation of their right to free speech under the First Amendment.  This 
iBrief will discuss two approaches recently taken by two different courts in response to this issue. 
The Technology  
Many Internet forums are conducive to anonymous posting.  “Screen names” act as 
pseudonyms and provide Internet users with the freedom to be recognized online without actually 
submitting their names with their messages.  Although many people may feel this is a complete 
shield to identity exposure, computer logs and records can often reveal the names of Internet 
users.1  Furthermore, sometimes Internet service providers such as Yahoo! have policies that 
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allow them to reveal the identities of their users when the service provider is subpoenaed, 
subjected to court orders or involved in a legal process.2  The fact that these companies can and 
will identify Internet users when asked by a court to do so forces courts to decide whether to 
protect the anonymity of Internet users sued for defamation or require their identity to be revealed 
in order to have a more easily administered defamation lawsuit. 
The Law of Defamation  
The tort of defamation began in American common law as an action completely defined 
by state law.  When a state determined a statement to be libelous, that statement was not entitled 
to First Amendment protection.3    
In 1964, the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan4 dramatically changed 
the face of defamation in the United States.  Sullivan, the plaintiff, was an Alabama public 
official whose public duties included supervising the Montgomery Police Department.5  During 
his time in office, the New York Times printed an advertisement that criticized the police 
department for what the advertisers considered harassment of the African Americans in the South 
and an attempt to terrorize Martin Luther King, Jr.  The advertisement contained several 
inaccuracies, but did not identify Sullivan or his office.6  Sullivan sued the Times, claiming that 
he had been defamed.7  The courts in Alabama all held for Sullivan, but the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the decision.8  In doing so, the Court established that state defamation 
rules are limited by First Amendment principles.  Furthermore, the Court held that when public 
officials sue for defamation, they must prove a higher standard of fault than private individuals.  
They must prove the defendant publisher acted with actual malice, which it defined as knowledge 
of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.9     
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to public 
figures,10 and held that private individuals must prove actual malice only when trying to obtain 
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punitive damages in a case dealing with a matter of public concern.11    When a private individual 
sues for defamation regarding a matter of private concern, no actual malice must be proven, even 
for punitive damages.    
Although defamation in the United States has changed substantially over the years, it is 
now fairly well-established.  For today’s plaintiff to prevail in a defamation action, he must prove 
publication of the defamatory statement, identification of the plaintiff, falsity, defamatory 
content, injury and fault.12  If the plaintiff is a public official or public figure and the subject 
matter is a matter of public concern, or if the plaintiff is a private individual seeking punitive 
damages for a statement involving a matter of public concern, he must prove actual malice to 
establish the fault element.13  Otherwise, states are free to establish their own fault standards for 
recovery.              
Anonymity on the Internet & Libel – The Debate  
While defamation since the Sullivan case has become an increasingly more defined and 
established tort, the introduction of the Internet and its anonymity-based forums for discussion 
have created a new wrinkle in the administration of defamation actions.   
Few plaintiffs want to sue an anonymous defendant for libel.  From a practical 
standpoint, discovery becomes a nightmare.  Speakers are able to defame an individual or 
company and hide behind the anonymity of a “screen name” unless a judge orders their identities 
revealed.  The resulting cost to the plaintiff can be far above what it would be in a case where the 
speaker was identified. Sometimes, if the speaker’s identity were revealed, plaintiffs would not 
judge the lawsuit worthy of their time or of their money. For instance, a judge who is defamed by 
an individual whom she sentenced to a prison might not feel the need to obtain a libel judgment 
against him to clear her name. The fact that the speaker is likely to have a grudge against her 
speaks for itself.  And finally, the fault element becomes infinitely harder to prove, if not 
impossible, when the speaker’s identity is unknown. 
On the other side of the debate, speakers cloaked in aliases claim that anonymous speech 
has traditionally been protected by the First Amendment, and that revealing the identities of the 
Internet speakers for the purpose of  libel suits would not only chill speech in the United States, 
but also subject the speakers to harassment by political or economic superiors before a successful 
claim of libel has even been proven. 
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The Case Law  
In the last few years, Internet libel suits involving anonymous statements have begun 
cropping up in courtrooms across the country.  The two notable cases discussed below exhibit 
different approaches to solving the problems presented by anonymous  libel on the Internet.  One 
seems to provide a satisfying solution while the other creates practical problems that undermine 
the tort of defamation all together.  
Melvin v. Doe 
In November 2000, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, PA, held that if the 
plaintiff could prove the identity of defendant was “(1) material, relevant, and necessary, (2) 
cannot be obtained by alternative means, and (3) is crucial to plaintiff’s case,” the First 
Amendment would not protect the anonymity of the defendant.14  In Melvin v. Doe, an unknown 
person published statements on a website that accused a local judge of political activity that was 
inappropriate for a judge in her position.15  The plaintiff sued the unknown speaker for 
defamation and tried to obtain his identity during discovery.16  The defendant petitioned the court 
for a protective order that would prevent this discovery.17  However, the order was denied.18  The 
court reasoned that a state’s interest in discouraging defamatory statements about public officials 
by traditional media extended to statements made on the Internet.  It held that because of this 
interest, there was no absolute immunity for Internet speakers with regard to the defamation 
tort.19  The court then applied the three-part test discussed above to the request for the speaker’s 
identity.20  Without much discussion about the test’s application to the specific facts of the case, 
the court held that the plaintiff’s interest outweighed the defendant’s, and the protective order 
should be denied.21 
The Ampex case 
While the Melvin case was decided in 2000, more recently, a judge in California took a 
different approach to the Internet anonymity question.  The Contra Costa County Superior Court 
ruled that plaintiffs in libel actions must prove that the allegedly libelous statement is in fact 
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libelous before the identity of the speaker will be revealed.22  In this case, the plaintiff, Ampex, 
asked the judge to reveal the identity of an Internet speaker who posted anonymous messages 
about the company and its executives.  Ampex claimed the messages were defamatory and said it 
needed the identity of the speaker so the lawsuit could proceed.23   The judge rejected this request 
and gave Ampex a week to prove the statements were libelous before the plaintiff could obtain 
the speaker’s identity.24 
Analysis 
While the Melvin balancing-test approach to anonymous speech on the Internet and libel 
actions might create extra work for a libel plaintiff before he can successfully proceed with a 
defamation action, it is certainly preferable to the more recent Ampex approach.  Proving libel 
before receiving the identity of the defendant is practically problematic, if not impossible.  
Although the plaintiff could potentially prove publication, identification of himself within the 
statement, defamatory content, falsity and injury, proving a fault standard without the identity of 
the plaintiff is a daunting task.  Actual malice is a subjective determination of the publisher’s 
state of mind with regard to the falsity of his statement at the time of publication, and the 
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff has a right to inquire into that state of mind.25  It is not 
difficult to see that without knowing who the defendant actually is in a libel suit how problematic 
or impossible it would be to prove the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the publication.  
Even negligence would be difficult to prove under the same circumstances.  The Ampex approach 
seems almost a ridiculous answer to a very important question.  Perhaps the court could require 
proof simply that the message held defamatory content, caused injury, identified the plaintiff and 
was false, but requiring proof that the complete tort of defamation occurred is asking too much. 
Conclusion 
The tort of defamation has become a well-established area of law over the last few 
decades.  With the advent and success of the Internet, a piece of this established tort has become 
more complicated.  Ultimately, when dealing with the identity of anonymous Internet speakers in 
defamation actions, the approach in Melvin v. Doe is a better solution than the one advanced in 
Ampex.  Perhaps in Melvin, the court had an easier call to make with regard to identity because 
the plaintiff had already proven other elements of the defamation tort, falsity, defamatory content 
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and injury.  However, the three-part test applied in Melvin is ultimately a more practical and 
thoughtful approach that allows a court to find a balance between the rights of the speaker to 
speak freely and the right of plaintiffs to recover for defamation without placing the plaintiff in an 
overly burdensome, if not paradoxical, position of proof. 
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